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Films, and perhaps especially animated films, are ways of thinking. In their own ways, and beyond any intention of human filmmakers, films think. Animations think especially hard about movement, time and, unsurprisingly, animation: what motivates something to move. In their remarkably different ways, Muto (2007–8) and Der Lauf der Dinge (1987) undertake a radical thinking-through of change, respectively as mutation and its constituents, and the capacities of film generally and animation specifically to unhinge and rearticulate classifications of human, environmental and technological life. Muto is a seven-minute graphic by Italian street artist Blu filmed in stop-motion on location in Buenos Aires as the artist and his team paint, erase and redraw a series of evolving figures on the walls of the city. Der Lauf der Dinge (The Way Things Go) is a 30-minute film by Swiss artists Peter Fischli and David Weiss which documents in a succession of long takes (with carefully concealed edits) a series of homemade devices which variously decompose, fall, crash and burn to produce a chain reaction of events. The two are comparable because both photograph the real world – suitably amended. Both are in this sense pro-filmic animations – that is, made with a camera shooting things placed in front of it; one using traditional stop-motion to capture change; the other setting up a series of animated events to film in real time. 

Many animators, from Norman MacLaren’s pixilations in Neighbours (1952) to John Ryan’s Captain Pugwash live-action puppet animations, produced for the BBC by Gordon Murray between 1957 and 1966 – and including Blu’s more recent Big Bang Big Boom (2010) – enrich the traditions of animating by shooting more than single stop-frames. Nonetheless, there may be some controversy about including Der Lauf Der Dinge as an animated film. Rule 19 of the 2017 Academy Awards of Merit states, somewhat equivocally, ‘An animated film is defined as a motion picture in which movement and characters’ performances are created using a frame‑by-frame technique … Motion capture and real-time puppetry are not by themselves animation techniques’ (Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences 2017). The Academy clearly wants to protect the craft of animators from rival cinematographic techniques, even when they ‘photograph’ only movements, not appearance. Here, I will hold to the principle that animating events in order to photograph them is equivalent to other forms of animation. Let us leave aside the venerable history of motion and performance capture, dating back to Marey’s chronophotographic experiments in the 1880s (Dagognet 1992), through the Gilbreth’s time-and-motion studies between 1907 and 1924 (Price 1989) to contemporary effects movies whose hybridity must give the Academy judges sleepless nights (see, for example, Freedman 2012). If instead of restricting animation to a named family of techniques like the Academy, we take as principle that animation gives cinematic life to the inanimate, or re-animates the already animate differently (as in Neighbours), then filmed puppetry not only fits the definition but connects cinema to the ancient shadow puppets of the firelit cave and the marionettes and toys that feature so deeply in folk tales and folk theatres. That history, if we peer into it, suggests not only the uncanny of statues springing to life but a dim and twisted memory of panpsychism, the belief in the universal mind that animates the oldest religions, contests with mathematics the foundations of modern science and underpins Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis (1979) and Naess’s deep ecology (1990). The comparison between Muto and Der Lauf der Dinge can tell us more about the nature of both animation and experiment than definitional exclusion ever could. Perhaps equally significantly, it may offer a way to address, again, how animation thinks the historical divagations of panpsychism.

At times anthropocentric, at others devoted to the unhuman intelligence that tells a cherry stone to grow into a cherry tree, the history of panpsychism writes the history of the utopian (and at times exploitative) yearning for a union with nature. Its principle of a commonality between human and natural includes the faith that the human is, in potential if not actuality, itself a natural process. The implication must be that ecological thinking cannot stop at the human, that the non-human (including animated films) also thinks, and that ecological thinking about art and culture cannot stop short when there are no explicit themes or motifs in the work in front of us, any more than feminism stopped at films ‘about’ women. The intricate and historically miserable relations between human and non-human – first expressed in that baleful separation of the two – do not permit such wilful silence. Popular animation has constantly thought through human–animal metamorphoses and through permutations of the landscape tradition. Experimental animation, like experimental film more generally, has an equally robust history of engagement with animals and environments; and both have a deep engagement in the non-human animation of film technologies. The two short films that occupy this chapter, differently animated, inhabit again, in profound and passionate as well as charming ways, the uncanny hinterland between human, technological and natural, and, in inhabiting, alter the porosity, polarity and expanse of their borders and thresholds. 

Art as experiment is utopian: it seeks something other and better. As utopia, art is a will to transcendence. Whether as negation (Adorno 1997) or as project (Brecht 1964), art wants to realise the human elsewhere than in the mundane world. Since the Renaissance, a key aspect of this transcendent aspiration has been the realisation that the transcendence of subjectivity, of the subject, must include the transcendence of its object, a legacy perhaps of the Cabbalistic tiqqun, the belief that with the arrival of the Messiah, the whole world, not just the humans in it, will be redeemed. For Classicism, this object of transcendence is the artwork itself; for Romanticism, it is the world transfigured in art. The two works considered here are in this sense Romantic. They are prepared to sacrifice perfection of form to the task of transfiguring everything they picture. As philosophy of nature, Romanticism seeks transcendence with and in the transformation of the world, a theme that reaches its height in landscape art on the one hand, and in the cinema on the other. In the former, the soul seeks in nature an escape from its alienation from nature; while in the latter, it struggles to overthrow the isolation that formal classical perfectionism imposes, in which nature was constantly framed as object of knowledge and exploitation, to try instead to bring it into the domain of a no-longer alienated ego through contemplation, empathy and identification. These are the contradictory tools that such animations take up. 

Even though animation also has its classicists, especially in digital animation from James Blinn to Universal Everything, they too arrive at the following dilemma. The flight of transcendence, whether inward or outward, whether into fantasy or into reality, whether forming or informed, is always the product of a devastating desire for settlement (Glissant 1997, 16–17). The will to transcendence, classical or romantic, is at once a cause of and a form of mourning for a loss of settlement. What drives Renaissance transcendence is the same desire that drove Renaissance colonialism (Mignolo 2003, 219ff): what lies ahead. But to achieve that future, one has to leave home. In that loss, and the overwhelming need to create a new home, lies the tragedy and absurdity of art, as well as its glory. When we speak of ‘home’, we mean a place where we fit. The place left behind is the place where the distinction between human and environment, the precursor of the subject–object relation, has not yet come about. The transcendental search for home cannot be a return to the scene of the primal, mutual ejection of living beings and environments, subjects and objects from one another. It must be a creation, and one that recognises the tragic loss which is the condition for its existence as transcendental yearning. 

Muto and Der Lauf share a practice of recording an actual but artificial pro-filmic that is unsettled in two ways: by fantasy and by absurd plan. Muto opens with a time-lapse of dawn over the city, the camera then panning over to a wall where the first painted animation will begin, as the soundtrack moves from the actual sounds of the city to the fictional sound of the animation. A brick, singled out by paint, becomes a fictional brick tumbling to reveal a fictional hole through which first one arm then half a dozen emerge, pull themselves through the gap and set off along the wall. A rubbery, rhythmic music track accompanies the multi-armed creature’s walk until it grows an eye and meets another of its kind with a high-pitched jabber of ‘dialogue’. Entangled, they fall over, become the brain of a bigger head whose teeth fall out and, changing from vertical to horizontal, scatter along the pavement. We follow one as it creeps up the wall again, turning into an ox from which a man emerges whose lightbulb-shaped head shatters to be replaced by geometric ‘heads’, each of which smashes with a sneeze and a tinkle of glass, leaving him with a cube head from which other cubes tumble until the topmost opens and a infantile figure emerges made of feet and head. As it hops along the wall with sync boings, the drawing and erasures cover over pre-existing street art. Its mouth becomes a birth canal from which successive mouths emerge, the last giving birth to a fat naked man who crawls along until two hands open his body and take out a jewel that grows robot limbs, scuttling along and kicking over in the process a real log propped against the wall before condensing once again into the jewel form. A headless naked man triggers the jewel into a series of geometric permutations before placing it, still flickering from shape to shape, on the top of his neck, where it takes over his whole body, which adds more and more and more facets until it too shatters to allow a man, this time with a head, to emerge from it. He arrives before two monumental legs as cars flash by in the street beyond the corner of the wall. He offers his head to the hand that descends, as the whole figure squeezes into the wall, popping the head into its mouth like a sweetie. The motif of geometric figures and head begins again, and the cycle of heads emerging from heads, until a house resolves, from which a multi-limbed figure escapes, passing through a tunnel into an interior, where it hangs itself up from a real peg in the wall; its spawn recreate themselves by releasing homunculi from doors in their chests till the last eats real sheets of paper, traverses a ceiling and knocks over some real bricks; finally metamorphosing into a chrysalis that returns through the tunnel to the exterior, becomes a man with butterfly wings, which he eats before vomiting flies that consume another head, leaving nothing but a grinning skeleton. 

Aside from the clearly fantastic mutations, and the legacy of the fantastic free invention of Emile Cohl's Fantasmagorie (1904) and Ryan Larkin’s Street Musique (1972), some motifs return: the male figures that, in various extravagant ways, give birth to their like without any sexual differentiation; an oscillation between anthropomorphic forms, however bizarre, and geometric; the multiple ways that heads are missing or transformed, suggesting an acephalic aesthetic that might evoke Bataille’s Acéphale, the review he ran from 1936 to 1939 in protest against the triumph of reason and of humanity as head of the universe. It might be too that the geometric/anthropomorphic mutations suggest a struggle between semantic and cybernetic conceptions of the human, and especially of men, since no female forms appear at all. But the iconography of Muto is not all that keeps us watching, or attracted nearly 12 million views on YouTube. It is the invention of a technique for making street art come alive; to make the walls, pavements and abandoned interiors of the city places of fantasy and strangeness. The mutations of these language-less creatures provide an alternative to the logic of urbanism. They match the particular attraction of YouTube videos, as attractions in Gunning’s sense (Gunning 1990), because in their very carefully articulated mindlessness, they create the possibility for a simultaneous display of potential meaning and its failure to realise itself in any concrete thought. The acephalic produces – in the heart of the city, which is the most extreme of human environments – the possibility of a humanity that no longer carries the burden of signifying: and that is in this sense, but also in the sense of the endless mutations of evolutionary process that do not end up as successful new species, insignificant. 

Where the site of Muto is the street as a kind of hinterland between the rational city and its acephalic underworld, in Der Lauf der Dinge Fischli and Weiss’s studio has the same relationship to the laboratory as privileged site of reason. The film fades in from black on a scarcely decipherable swirl of greys and blacks that resolves, as the camera pulls back, into a plastic sack turning on a rope, slowly unwinding until it strikes a discarded tyre that rolls slowly, to knock a weight hung from a shelf that tilts up and around to nudge the tyre on to knock a stick which dislodges a weighted stepladder on an inclined plane to hit another inclined plane, loosing a table to slip down and trigger a weight suspended from a pole that swivels round its axis and start the next stage of the process. Along the way, discarded items drop to the studio’s concrete floor and roll off screen: a steel weight, a yellow plastic bottle. Everything is old, used, scruffy: the antithesis of the antiseptic lab. After a reprise of the plastic sack/tyre gambit, we see the first chemical reaction. From here on, various foams eat through barriers, overflow boundaries and are set alight by waiting nightlight flames. Chemical and mechanical, like the 16mm film that it is recorded on, the onward linkage of reactions returns over and over to scenes of perilous equilibrium: a chair balanced on two legs by a table, on which a jug stands asymmetrically on a block of wood; a candle on a board we know will rock when a plastic cup full of some brown weight tips onto it, and will roll down towards a waiting chemical device. We learn to anticipate the tricks, or are baffled by a particular step and are delighted when a collar slips from a deflating balloon. In a sudden flurry, a tabletop becomes the arena where a swift succession of chemical-mechanical tricks race us on before another slower passage of a rolling oil drum. For a moment we think a stunt has failed when a rolling tyre’s firework propellant seems to have refused to light, or a swinging bag fails at first to hit the glass of water in front of it; and then we are off again: metals, woods, plastics and projectiles, liquids, gases, flames, fuses, foams, fireworks and fulcrums. The swinging ball trick reprises but this time in flames. An orrery of fire-blackened plastic bottles and tin cans powered by some steaming reaction inside. A pair of shoes appear to walk through eccentric motion driven by a rolling can, eccentric motion picked up a moment later by a mismatched pair of oval wooden wheels. Knives appear: on a roller skate, fired from a boiling kettle. The camera closes in on clouds of smoke, on flaring pyroclastics, on off-white and grey-black foams, and as it does we can inspect the textures of finger-moulded plasticine or metal guides that channel the fluids, or the worn or aged offcuts of wood or abandoned metal trays. The sound persuades us of the actuality of what we are watching: fizzing, bubbling, crashing, thumping, with the unmistakable properties of woods, metals, rubber and liquid. Even the edits are only half disguised, several occurring in plain sight, almost as interludes – etymologically ‘spaces between games’. Twice wheels or tyres bump their way up ladders, a continuity apparently in defiance of gravity. Some actions seem to be at the limit of achievable, as when a falling sheet of wood creates just enough wind to propel a cardboard box into the next obstacle. Our last view is of fumes drifting in close up. Under the closing credits there run a series of the sounds that we have been listening to: whizzes, gluggings, whistles. As if the games things play without us carry on when the camera is gone. 

The striking dialectic of Fischli and Weiss’s film is between the untidy scrapyard aesthetic of the things they use and the extreme precision of the stunts. The dialectic is perhaps most easily voiced as the oscillation between entropy and information that David Weiss described as ‘this energy of never-ending collapse’ (Millar 2012). Though the step ladders are only a step away from stepping, the only truly anthropomorphic moment involves the shoes, and there they are entirely removed from human action save only as another example of eccentric motion, the human gait reduced to the laws of physics. We might infer at a couple of moments that the artists had to intervene in their engineering of equilibrium and chaos, but they are there as ghosts, poltergeists, the servants of a machinery that only requires them, if at all, to adjust its autonomous collisions. The animation of Der Lauf belongs to a world without people. It was shown on British TV under the title Chain Reaction, with all the apocalyptic inferences of nuclear engineering gone wrong, suggesting perhaps not ‘without’ but after humanity: a world in which the debris of human habitation continues to react with the environment. At the same time, the studio itself figures throughout, even if only as background: the screened windows, the heating pipes, the stained concrete flooring. This constant background keeps us aware that these accidents are the product of careful organisation, even if that organisation serves only entropy.

Placed together, the two films present two poles of entropy: constant becoming as a form of insignificance in Muto, and precision as precursor to the random instance in Der Lauf. The dualities of these two films open onto an intellectual history of anima, the soul and the mind, that begins with the Indo-European word for ‘breath’, the puff of life that animates the clay. Muto becomes, where Der Lauf falls apart. At the same time, Der Lauf der Dinge is obviously planned, for all its messy execution. Its accidents then appear, as in the mediaeval distinction between essence and accidence, as only one of many possible outcomes of its design. Muto’s autonomy is equally clearly not that of a plan but its fantasía recalls the experimentation of Cohl’s Fantasmagorie, undertaken with no model to follow, the part-random outcome of a plan of work whose expression on film is guessed at but not utterly under control. But looked at from a third perspective, though both share the motivated camera and ambient available light of documentary, Muto’s perpetual edit (a cut for every frame) constrains as it enables the fantastical becoming of its mutations, while the long takes in Lauf ascribe autonomy not to the imagination of the artist but to the things (Dinge) and the way they run, their race, or, in another translation, the course of things (as in ‘the course of the year’). Muto starts with an escape from the walls of the city and ends with a skull. In Der Lauf, we are already in a realm beyond life, where something other than life animates: or where the raw processes of life (chemical, mechanical) operate in the absence of any living creature – a posthumous world. Even the soundtracks separate the two. Muto – whose title might also suggest that its creatures are mute – adds a designed soundtrack, with elements pointing towards music and dialogue, those characteristic forms of organic life. In Der Lauf, we encounter only the scraping and sputtering of inanimate processes, like the imagined soundscape of Duchamp’s The Large Glass (1915-23) that Richard Hamilton imagines in the closing lines of his translation of the Green Box (Duchamp 1960). 

The a-signifying of evolving (and perhaps evolutionary) fantasy as acephalic déraison in Muto and the a-human entropic energies of Der Lauf suggest that the animated is not human in any easily reparable form; yet in both, the presence of the street – as metonym of the city – and the studio – as homologue of the laboratory – place the unseating of reason and the unleashing of entropy, two ways of negating the triumph of information, in relation with the human world. Just as entropy has a semantic function in the conduct of life, from the mathematical theory of communication to post-Deleuzean ontologies, so insignificance, and even more so the a-signifying, underpin both semantics and epistemology. Once again, however, the ontological and epistemological dimensions of these works do not explain their appeal. These types of irrationality are at once negatives, unpicking the solidity of the world and our relations with it, and positive liberations of the autonomy of both the mind and the world of things. If it is the case that their iconography is only part of their charm, and that their philosophical dimensions contribute to but do not exhaust it, we are left with the hypothesis that they call up, in the imagination, something about inhabiting the world, something about our environmental status as beings in the world. The hypothesis, then, is that they act as analogies for something about what it is to be alive: analogues of social and natural processes. 

Street art as cultural process is a contest for urban space. Animating the cultural work of graffiti in Muto then sets up an analogon of social process, which may well also be allegorised in the fantastic evolution of the drawing – cannibalism, for instance, as a metaphor for the relations between graffiti artists and corporate interests in the neo-liberal city. In Der Lauf, the analogon is of natural processes, even though, and precisely because, the natural is wholly excluded from the mise-en-scène. In both instances, the analogy concerns animating what is already animate, a secret animation, the secret of the soul, life, mind, breath. In the former, however, animating the cultural praxis of street art is an expansion of the existing life, so that the analogy is between things of a similar kind; whereas in Der Lauf, the natural processes of combustion and the laws of motion are stripped back from their instantiations in biology to the rudiments of physics and chemistry, so that the analogy is that much more distant. 

I argued above that art is a pursuit of utopia, and that these films are examples of utopia imagined through transcendence. The question of analogy is always a question about transcendence because the analogon – the material into which the existing is transformed in the process of metaphor – is by definition of a different order, apart from the mundane existence of the actual. At the beginning of his philosophical career, Jean-Paul Sartre in The Imaginary (1940) set out to establish ‘whether the necessary conditions for realizing an imaginative consciousness are the same as or different from the conditions of possibility of a consciousness in general’ (Sartre 2004, 180; original emphasis). Among the analytic tools he develops is the idea that the phenomenological encounter with an object is always a matter of perspective, and that only a relation over time allows the object in the round to give itself to knowledge. In imagination – and we could add, in 3D digital animation – the facets and dimensions of the thing can be present all at once. But as image, the imaginary is restricted to a single perspective. Moreover, the image cannot float free but must appear, and therefore has to have some material bearer, which Sartre calls the analogon. The imagined image has no actuality; by realising it in material form, as analogon, the ‘concept’ of a musical score or theatre script becomes real, and in so doing realises not only the image itself but potentials that, as unrealised idea, it had no way of exploring. In Sartre, the contemplative ‘imaging attitude’ of consciousness lacks reality, so invoking the ‘realising attitude’, in which, by realising its images and concepts in the material of the analogon, consciousness returns itself to the real world. Speaking of the mental image, Sartre writes, ‘the imaginary object can be posited as nonexistent or as absent or as existing elsewhere or not be posited as existent. We notice that the common characteristic of these four theses is that they include the entire category of negation, though in different degrees. Thus the negative act is constitutive of the image’ (Sartre 2004, 183), an observation which he then clarifies by arguing that 'an image is not purely and simply the world denied, but is always the world denied from a certain point of view' (Sartre 2004, 184). To negate the world absolutely is a philosophical act of pure reason: it is in the imagination that the world is denied from a specific place. We displace the world by imaging it, since, Sartre argues, every image refers to something absent. But the image itself is still present; indeed, ‘the analogon is presence. Hence these contradictory syntheses’ (Sartre 2004, 91; original emphasis): the image is a present absence. His major preoccupation is with images as they appear in consciousness. But his identification of the analogon helps us trace the work of these animations as they picture for consciousness something which is not present, as the makers of both are made significantly absent by the traces of their orchestration of the events on screen. Equally, the foregrounding of the animated elements – the drawings in Muto, the machines in Der Lauf – draws our attention to the present-absence of the street and the studio, as both in turn point towards the absent‑presences of the city and the laboratory. In the central passage of Der Lauf where we watch the ‘orrery’ of bottles and cans, our view is constantly obstructed by smoke from burning iron filings. That smoke, like the stop-motion edits in Muto, is both visible and invisible. The dialectic of entropy and order, of insignificance and becoming, is played out at the same formal level where makers and environments both appear and disappear. It is in this interplay that, as Sartre has it, consciousness returns itself to the real world beyond the realia that are pictured for us in the films, analogons, in their turn, of the events staged in front of their cameras. 

This might be a simple enough argument to make about live-action films, but in animation, there are some subtleties which create more complex relations of analogy. Digital animation is more immediately ‘imaginary’ in Sartre’s sense because it plays across the distinction between the real, which gives itself to knowledge in a time-based manner, showing itself from different aspects, and the image, which has only one aspect to show. On the other hand, the image in consciousness outlives the destruction of the physical analogon, the material support (Muto erases each drawing in order to create the next, yet we recall the predecessor when we see the image in motion; Der Lauf establishes precarious equilibria in order to destroy them, but we recall the previous state when we relish its destruction). The moving image has a different relation to the reality it stands in for, and the animated image a different one again, since it allows us not only to hold the instant, whole and entire, but to play with both the variety of perspectives we can see it from, and the time it takes both to look differently and for the object to change. In these films, Muto exposes what is not there in the first instance, or the last – the potential that the walls have to become other than they are; while Der Lauf exposes the roundness of the time-based activities of these mechano-chemical agents. The question – a question at least – is then where the agency lies and where the subjectivity: in the artist (of course), the apparatus (house paint, detritus of a workshop) and the camera. Both films demand an inevitably impossible (or inevitably incomplete) identification by the viewer with all three that comes across as awe and laughter.

This unfinished quality divides these works from the perfected form of Classicism. It also shapes their Romanticism, typically related to the necessarily unfinished task of changing the world, by emphasising that the world they encounter is itself radically uncertain, radically capable of different evolutions from the start points imaged and imagined in their production processes. The production of moving images in these films is not a reduced imitation but an act, the realisation of an imagining which parallels visions of the world and the process of inhabiting it, not as actual (the indexical relation) but as potential. Neither film can ever completely or finally make the definitive version of the potentialities it unleashes, in the same way that a performance of a musical score never exhausts its possible reworkings. The capacity to be otherwise is intrinsic even in the ‘finished’ object that we see on screen. At the same time, however, the ‘finished’ image as analogon, as material substrate, is itself real, a really realised realisation in material form which thus guarantees the existence of an otherwise imperceptible (inaudible, invisible) intuition, premonition, design or concept without its own proper physical form. Neither ‘street culture’ nor ‘the laws of physics’ can be pictured in other than metonymic ways: we can use a mural or an apple falling from a tree as emblems of each, but the pictures are only parts of a whole to which they pay homage, but which is inevitably incomplete. But we are not here in the realm of documentary: we do not hope to see the sociology of urban culture or the laws of motion given holistic and realistic form. Instead, the concept drives the analogon to make concrete, in a series of mutations (Muto) and events (Der Lauf), concepts which have no concrete form of their own. This is not, however, a matter of conceptualising and finding the suitable analogon to express the concept. The animation of the world in order to make a moving image of a particularly insignificant or entropic quality is not simply informed by but in-forms the concept, expanding here, contracting there, determining the material analogon while exposing not simply the conditions but also the contingencies of its existence and therefore its potential to become otherwise than what we have seen reductively as the ostensibly finished works. 

Muto was made at the height of the global financial crisis in a country already famous for its debt crises; Der Lauf der Dinge at the high-water mark of the neo-liberal seizure of the state in a country famed as a major holder of the world’s debt and the looted wealth of the Global South. Separated by twenty years, these two films sit at either end of an economic era whose long posthumous apocalypse we are still living through. To define either as analogons of neo-liberal political economy would be feasible and illuminating in its way, but reductive if unalloyed with a sense of what else is mediated through their addresses to chaos as energy. It is more likely that these mediations of potential are inflected by the mediations of political economy than by political economy itself; and that these mediations may prove to be as informative of their environing political economy as their environments are of them. 

Animation animates things but also animates modes of knowing things, sometimes as proper names, sometimes as common nouns; sometimes as science, sometimes as magic. Truly indexical cinema is a cinema of the proper name: each image the single unique specification of an encounter between camera and event. Perhaps the truest indexical images are those that we make initially not for circulation but as mementos: snapshots and family movies. In the mid-1980s, the proliferation of VHS cameras opened the vista onto mass participation in movie-making. By 2007–8, when Blu was shooting Muto, we were already in the era of mass distribution of these intimate indices. These films bracket the coming into existence of a new phenomenon: the mass image, created by the mass availability of both production and distribution media, and commercialised on interlinked social media platforms and search engines. Among the many things to say about this new mass image -a database of all uploaded images- is that it is data, and that the data takes the form not of whole individuals but of behaviours and the trends that connect them – as if Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the diagram and the dividual had come back to haunt us in their commodified form. In concluding, let us consider as a hypothesis the possibility that these works are concerned, at the emergence of the mass image, with strategies for creating the next cultural form that will negate and replace it – a version of the familiar hypothesis that, as the antennae of the species, artists seek out possible futures beyond the demands of the contemporary: that they are in deed as well as aspiration utopian transcendentalists. Muto presents the ontological case: the world is not itself, and any image of it is always unstable, since the world cannot be reduced to self-identity. It is instead a boiling cauldron of invention and creativity, an infinite becoming, even if that becoming must start in the forgotten and disavowed interstices of the rational city. 

Muto is ontological: creativity is everywhere and immanent; Der Lauf is historical: creativity is a finite resource, and history cannot be trusted to be endlessly productive, imaginative and wholesome. Benjamin’s third thesis concerning ‘On the Concept of History’ (2003, 390) demands that human redemption must include the redemption of every act from the past that ‘nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history'. Benjamin was looking forward to redemption of the world and all its things: the kind of redemption that would save not only the ruined human past but also our ruined environments. What he could not foretell was that the mass image would become just such a repository, no longer dedicated to redemption but to the logistical exploitation not only of the living but of the dead. However, it would be wrong to blame this on technology which, like environment, is non-human only by an act of exclusion. In technology we have stored all the wisdom and many of the stupidities of our ancestors, inscribed in metals and textiles, stored in the systems and techniques of ‘dead labour’ (Marx 1973, 693–4). It is then clear that Benjaminian redemption also demands the work of liberating enslaved ancestral technology. In death, the dead lose their potential to act, becoming wholly actual. But as actual, they are the coiled springs of potential. To redeem therefore first requires revealing the potential of these ancestors ‘congealed’, as Marx has it, in technology. Kant (1952, §65) and Hegel (1969, §1543) agree that their external teleology distinguishes machines from living creatures, whose teleology is internal (a duck lives in order to live; a machine works in order to serve the living). What then if we were to build machines with autonomous teleologies? What if, put otherwise, we were to remove the determinants that stop machines writing their own evolution? The myth of the anti-human AI belongs to the ideology that our ancestors must be kept in servitude inside the black boxes of machinery; an ideological reflection of a justified fear that they might seek revenge for their millennia of imprisonment. The neo-liberal counter-argument is that autonomous evolution is not only possible, and employed everyday in developing complex systems, not least in logistics, but desirable: a new collaboration between phyla in the interests of a rational, not to say market-rational, delivery of better services, bigger profits. A third possibility is marked in both of our animations: that redeemed, the ancestors may be mad, or at least incomprehensible. Although made much earlier, Der Lauf der Dinge is more tempered in its depiction of creativity, seeing it not as an infinite renewal but as thoroughly dependent on decaying resources and the fragile arrangement of accidents whose clumsy achievement of their design has the pitiful range of clown gymnastics. In this, it is not only true to environmental principle, as is Muto, that every action, every act of making, has a cost in energy that eventually sums at the perfect equilibrium of collapse; but recognises that liberating the locked potential of the ancestors is not a return to their individuality, still less a lost communalism, but instead a future tailored to the present: a logistical overcoming of the logistical management of human, natural and technological existence. In both films, the world is alive, comes alive, remakes itself as living; but both foreshadow the enormous cost – Muto in its iconography, Der Lauf in its manic marionettes – of breaking free from the managed world. Animation has charms; experimental animations also may have terror and violence. Benjamin’s Jetzseit, the narrow gate through which the redeemer can arrive to blast history open, is the time of film, that time which animation opens up as raw material; the analogon between film and consciousness goes both ways – what makes one mortal gives the other all of history as its playground.
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